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LAWYERS ON TRIAL: JUROR HOSTILITY TO 
DEFENDANTS IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS* 
Herbert M. Kritzer** & Neil Vidmar*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An enduring question in the study of civil justice is whether certain 
types of parties are advantaged or disadvantaged as litigants. Professor 
Marc Galanter’s classic essay, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,1 raises this question in 
terms of resources and experience and has been the subject of extensive 
testing.2 Other research has examined whether certain demographic 
factors, such as race3 or gender,4 disadvantage plaintiffs, whether 
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the first author as part of another study, and Thomas Lindsay, at the University of Minnesota 
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Association Meeting in Minneapolis held from May 28 to June 1. 
 ** Marvin J. Sonosky Chair of Law and Public Policy, University of Minnesota Law School; 
B.A. Haverford College; Ph.D. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
 *** Russell M. Robinson II Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, Duke University; 
B.A. MacMurray College; Ph.D. University of Illinois. 
 1. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
 2. See generally Brian J. Glenn, The Varied and Abundant Progeny, in IN LITIGATION: DO 
THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 371 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003) 
(discussing Marc Galanter’s contributions to academic discourse). 
 3. AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, INST. CIVIL JUSTICE, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY 
POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 37-41 (1985). 
 4. See NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., INST. CIVIL JUSTICE, CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS 
IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS 32 (2004). See generally Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden 
Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004). 
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government litigants are particularly advantaged,5 and whether deep-
pocket corporate defendants are disfavored by juries.6 In this Article, we 
examine a group one might expect to come to court as advantaged 
players—lawyers. 
Society has long had a love-hate relationship with the legal 
profession.7 Public opinion polls typically show that lawyers are held in 
low esteem, usually being described as untrustworthy, manipulative, and 
overly concerned about their own financial advantage.8 As Galanter has 
reported, these views of lawyers are reflected in the large corpus of jokes 
told about lawyers.9  
Indeed, public disdain for lawyers is neither a new phenomenon, 
nor a phenomenon restricted to the United States or other common law 
countries. William Shakespeare’s plays include eleven references to 
lawyers, nine of which are negative or mocking.10 John Stuart Mill is 
quoted criticizing a lawyer as being ready “to frustrate justice with his 
tongue.”11 On the continent, Prussian King Wilhelm issued an edict in 
1739 proclaiming: 
[T]hose advocates, procurators and draftsmen . . . who dare make 
people rebellious by having soldiers hand over to His Royal Majesty 
petitions on the most negligible matters or any other documents on  
 
 
                                                          
 5. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come Out Ahead in 
Appellate Courts?, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 342, 343-50 
(Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003); Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The 
Government Litigant Advantage: Implications for the Law, 28 FLA. ST. L. REV. 391, 397-407 
(2000). 
 6. VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 42 (2000). 
 7. Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care? 29 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1405, 1407-17 (1999). 
 8. Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, 
and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 808-10 (1998); Gross, supra note 7, at 1416. 
 9. MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES & LEGAL CULTURE 16 (2005). 
 10. These figures are derived from MARVIN SPEVACK, THE HARVARD CONCORDANCE TO 
SHAKESPEARE (1973). While the best known of these quotes—“first thing we do, let’s kill all the 
lawyers”—is spoken by a character who is himself less than upright, other lines reflect the 
perceived greed of lawyers: “then ‘tis like the breath of an unfee’d lawyer” or “[o]’er lawyers’ 
fingers, who straight dream on fees.” See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 4; 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 1, sc. 4; WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND 
PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2. It is important to note, however, that a goodly portion 
of the audience at the Globe Theatre was lawyers who came from the Inns of Court which are more 
or less directly across the Thames from where the Globe stood. 
 11. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 12 (1973). Public opinion polls in 
England show a decline in “approval ratings for lawyers” in recent years. ALAN PATERSON, 
LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: DEMOCRACY IN ACTION? 18 (2012). 
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justice, such as those asking for pardon, shall be hanged with a dog 
hanged at their side, granting neither mercy nor pardon.12 
A 1978 poll conducted by a French television broadcaster queried 982 
viewers as to their images of the avocat; fewer than 5% held a positive 
view.13 Of those holding a negative view: 18% conveyed general 
negative attitudes; 48% felt that the avocat was a “money sucker”; 14% 
saw him as a man without conscience; 14% felt that he acted with 
impunity; 4% considered him to be an auxiliary of scoundrels; and, 3% 
suspected him of connivance with his client’s opponent.14 
While most evidence of hostility toward lawyers takes expressive 
forms, such as jokes, popular culture, and attitudes, there is less evidence 
that the hostility has behavioral manifestations. There are generally held 
viewpoints specific to certain types of lawyers, particularly plaintiffs’ 
lawyers who bring personal injury suits or shareholder suits. These 
lawyers have been the targets of political campaigns and legislation. 
Another example that has been reported is the unwillingness of some 
landlords to rent apartments to lawyers.15 
In the United States, the public has another way to demonstrate its 
negativity toward the legal profession: assessing liability and damages in 
legal malpractice trials. In this Article, we report the results of an 
experiment designed to assess whether jury decisions in such cases 
reflect the public negativity one finds in public opinion polls, jokes, and 
other expressions of popular culture. 
                                                          
 12. Erhard Blankenburg & Ulrike Schultz, German Advocates: A Highly Regulated 
Profession, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 126 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. 
Lewis eds., 1988). 
 13. Tang Thi Thanh Trai Le, The French Legal Profession: A Prisoner of Its Glorious Past?, 
15 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 63, 63 (1982). L’avocats comprise one of many branches of the French legal 
profession. See Anne Boigeol, The French Bar: The Difficulties of Unifying a Divided Profession, 
in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 
1988). It is important to note that the figures referenced above refer to the public’s general 
perception of lawyers, not the evaluation of a lawyer by a former or current client. A 2001 study 
found generally positive views of lawyers representing individuals involved in court proceedings. 
See Enquête de Satisfaction Auprès des Usagers de la Justice: Mai 2001, RECHERCHE DROIT ET 
JUSTICE, http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/014000589.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
 14. Le, supra note 13, at 63. 
 15. Tom Goldstein, Landlords Backed on the Right to Bar the Well-Informed, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 1977, at A1 (reporting that a landlord could refuse to rent to lawyers because the housing 
anti-discimination law did not bar discrimination based on occupation). The New York City Council 
subsequently passed a measure barring discrimination based on occupation. See Alan Finder, 
Committee Votes a Ban on Job Bias in Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1986, at B1; see also David 
Berreby, Rent Wars: Lawyers vs. Landlords, NAT’L L.J., July 18, 1983, at 8; Gregg Geller, No 
Dogs, or Lawyers, Need Apply, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at CY 15. 
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II. THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE STUDY 
The experiment reported below is part of an ongoing, larger study 
of legal malpractice claims.16 That larger project has involved: a series 
of conversations with legal malpractice insurers and lawyers who 
represent either plaintiffs or defendants in legal malpractice lawsuits;17 
analyses of insurance reports of legal malpractice claims from Florida 
and Missouri (where state law requires reporting to the insurance 
commission);18 analyses of legal malpractice cases found in the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics (“BJS”) studies of civil verdicts for 1996, 2001, and 
2005;19 and, civil jury reports from Cook County, Illinois. It also builds 
on the first author’s experience as an observer in lawyers’ offices as part 
of his study of contingency fee legal practice.20 
Despite claims about the frequency of legal malpractice,21 one of 
the striking findings of our larger research project is the scarcity of trials 
involving legal malpractice claims. The data collected for the three BJS 
studies have a total of only 156 verdicts in legal malpractice cases 
compared to 1908 in medical malpractice cases, yielding a ratio of 
medical malpractice verdicts to legal malpractice verdicts of over 12 to 
1. The civil jury reports we obtained for Cook County for the period of 
January 1988 through December 2014 included 105 jury verdicts in legal 
malpractice cases.22 During that same period, the jury reporter recorded 
3802 verdicts in medical malpractice trials for a ratio of 36 to 1.23 
This is surprising given evidence that there are large numbers of 
potential legal malpractice claims. The best data on this matter come 
                                                          
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See generally Herbert M. Kritzer & Neil Vidmar, Handling Legal Malpractice Claims: 
Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, Defense Lawyers, and Insurers (working paper 2015) (on file with the Hofstra 
Law Review) (discussing legal malpractice claims). This paper was prepared for a presentation in 
Oñati, Spain at the workshop on Consumer Redress When Lawyers Are Negligent, Int’l Inst. for the 
Soc. of Law (July 9-10, 2015). 
 18. Id. at 8 n.44, 18 n.60. 
 19. Herbert M. Kritzer & Neil Vidmar, When the Lawyer Screws Up: A Portrait of Legal 
Malpractice Claims and Their Resolution 13 (working paper 2015) (on file with the Hofstra Law 
Review). 
 20. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL 
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 26, 96-98 (2004). 
 21. See Manuel Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession’s Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 1657, 1664-69 (1994). 
 22. The date range refers to when the report was published by the Illinois Jury Verdict 
Reporter rather than the date of the actual verdict. See Kritzer & Vidmar, supra note 17, at 14 & 
n.72. 
 23. Email from John Kirkton, Jury Verdict Reporter, Law Bulletin Publ’g Co., to Herbert 
Kritzer, Marvin J. Sonosky Chair of Law and Pub. Policy, Univ. Minn. Law Sch. (Feb. 4, 2015, 
8:14 AM) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). The figure for medical malpractice trials was 
provided by the publisher of the verdict editor. 
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from Oregon, which is the only state where legal malpractice insurance 
is mandatory for private practitioners.24 The annual claim rate based on 
figures from the Oregon Professional Liability Fund—the provider of 
the mandatory insurance—is about 12 claims per 100 insured lawyers.25 
Compare this ratio to the frequency of medical malpractice claims, 
which, according to a study using closed claim data from Texas before 
major limits on damages were implemented, ranged from 20 to 30 per 
100 physicians.26 A second study, using closed claim data from Florida, 
shows numbers suggesting claims per 100 physicians may be around 
10.27 This means that the ratio of medical malpractice claims to legal 
malpractice claims could be as low as 1 to 1 or as high as 2 or 3 to 1, 
while the ratio of medical malpractice to legal malpractice cases that 
reach trial is many times that. 
There are a variety of reasons why legal malpractice claims might 
be infrequent among cases that get to trial. First, the typical legal 
malpractice claim involves lower levels of damages than is the case in 
medical malpractice claims. While some legal malpractice claims 
involving corporate plaintiffs might entail seven, eight, or nine figure 
financial losses, many legal malpractice claims will not involve 
sufficient damages to make the cases attractive to lawyers working on a 
contingency fee basis because the percentage of the potential recovery is 
too low to generate a fee sufficient for the lawyer to want to take the 
case.28 Second, outside of Oregon, significant numbers of private 
                                                          
 24. Jeffrey D. Watters, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them: Why Clients Should Know if 
Their Attorney Does Not Carry Malpractice Insurance, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 245, 258 (2010). 
 25. This figure was computed using the number of claims for 2011, 2012, and 2013 as 
reported in recent annual reports of the Professional Liability Fund (“PLF”), and the number of 
lawyers insured by the fund as provided by Carol Bernick, Chief Executive Officer of PLF. See IRA 
R. ZAROV, PLF ANNUAL REPORTS, OR. ST. B. PROF. LIABILITY FUND, https://www.osbplf.org/ 
about-plf/annual-reports.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016); email from Carol Bernick, Chief Exec. 
Officer, PLF, to Herbert Kritzer, Marvin J. Sonosky Chair of Law and Pub. Policy, Univ. Minn. 
Law Sch. (Feb. 18, 2015, 2:58 PM) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). These figures reflect 
actual claims rather than simply notification from an insured of a potential claim. Email from Carol 
Bernick, Chief Exec. Officer, PLF, to Herbert Kritzer, Marvin J. Sonosky Chair of Law and Pub. 
Policy, Univ. Minn. Law Sch. (Apr. 6, 2015, 2:59 PM) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review) (“A 
file is opened when a claim is made. A claim is defined as a demand for money . . . directly from the 
claimant, from a lawyer for the claimant [or from our insured after receiving] a demand for money 
[from the claimant or the claimant’s lawyer].”). 
 26. Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 
1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 236 fig. 7 (2005). 
 27. Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: 
Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 332 tbl. 3 (2005). However, in making these 
comparisons it needs to be noted that in many medical malpractice cases the injuries may be far 
more serious than in legal malpractice cases. 
 28. This is also true of many medical malpractice claims. See Kritzer & Vidmar, supra note 
17, at 88. 
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practitioners, particularly those in small firms or solo practice where 
malpractice claims are most likely,29 are uninsured. For example, a 
survey conducted by the Texas State Bar in 2005 found that 63% of solo 
practitioners in Texas reported that they were uninsured.30 Third, the law 
and the judges and arbitrators who administer that law appear somewhat 
hostile toward claims of legal malpractice, consequently erecting 
barriers that do not exist with regard to negligence by members of other 
professions.31 Fourth, lawyers may be more willing to settle claims than 
are physicians, either because they fear the reputational hit of losing a 
legal malpractice case at trial or because they do not face the prospect of 
public reporting of payments made to resolve the claims, as do 
physicians who must report such payments to the publicly accessible 
National Practitioner Data Bank.32 Fifth, and most important for the 
analysis we present below, there is a perception among experienced 
litigators that juries are biased against lawyer defendants, and hence, 
legal malpractice cases may be settled before trial more often than other 
kinds of professional malpractice cases.33 Legal malpractice is usually a 
                                                          
 29. William H. Gates, Lawyers’ Malpractice: Some Recent Data About a Growing Problem, 
37 MERCER L. REV. 559, 559 (1986). It is easy to overstate the likelihood of malpractice among 
solo and small firm practitioners, but it is important to keep in mind that about three quarters of 
private practitioners work in such settings. See CLARA N. CARSON & JEEYOON PARK, AM. BAR 
FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2005, at 10 (2012). 
However, there is good evidence that the claim rate (claims per 100 or 1000 practitioners) is higher 
among small firms and solo practitioners than among large firm practitioners. See Tom Baker & 
Rick Swedloff, Liability Insurer Data as a Window on Lawyers’ Professional Liability, U.C. IRVINE 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 22) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review); Kritzer & 
Vidmar, supra note 17, at 2. 
 30. Chuck Herring & Bill Miller, Pro/Con Professional Liability Disclosure, 72 TEX. B.J. 
822, 823 n.2 (2009). 
 31. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
161-87 (2011); Louis A. Russo, The Consequences of Arbitrating a Legal Malpractice Claim: 
Rebuilding Faith in the Legal Profession, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 327, 340 (2006). 
 32. See Russo, supra note 31, at 336; Lawrence E. Smarr, A Comparative Assessment of the 
PIAA Data Sharing Project and the National Practitioner Data Bank: Policy, Purpose and 
Application, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS, 59, 68 (1997). 
 33. See Ramos, supra note 21, at 1681 (1994) (noting an increase in juror hostility toward 
lawyers). However, other sources argue that lawyers can receive a fair hearing by jurors and that 
they usually win malpractice cases that get to trial. See Lisa Chalidze, Defending the Legal 
Malpractice Claim Arising from Representation of Small Business, 62 AM. JUR. TRIALS 395 § 1 
(1997); Mark O’Neill, Do Juries Treat Lawyers Fairly in Legal Malpractice Cases, 58 DEF. COUNS. 
J. 248, 248-49 (1991). At least one commentary argues that defendant-lawyers are advantaged in 
legal malpractice cases due to bias by judges. Judicial Bias in Legal Malpractice Cases, VOLKEMA 
THOMAS MILLER & SCOTT, http://www.vt-law.com/blog/2012/01/judicial-bias-in-legal-malpractice-
cases.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). We note, however, Mark O’Neill cites high win rates for 
lawyers in legal malpractice cases—anywhere from 2 to 1 to as high as 4 to 1—which is not 
consistent with what we observed in either data collected by the BJS, which we reanalyzed, or data 
that we compiled using the Illinois Jury Verdict Reporter; the win rate for defendants in both of 
these data sources was around 50%: 51% in the BJS data and 44% in the Illinois data. 
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negligence-based tort claim.34 As such, the plaintiff must prove the four 
standard elements of negligence: (1) that the defendant had a duty to the 
plaintiff; (2) that the defendant had breached that duty; (3) that the 
breach had caused injury; and, (4) that the injury had resulted in damage 
to the plaintiff.35 The archetypical legal malpractice case arises when the 
lawyer has missed a filing deadline in a “slam-dunk” personal injury suit 
(for example, a passenger in a car involved in an accident, or a 
pedestrian in a crosswalk), which results in the plaintiff’s claim against 
the original tortfeasor being barred. A plaintiff in this situation will 
likely now have a claim against the lawyer who missed the filing 
deadline. Clearly, the lawyer had a duty to the plaintiff and presumably 
breached that duty. The question that will arise is whether that breach of 
duty caused any damage to the plaintiff; that is, would the plaintiff’s 
original claim have succeeded had the case gone to trial? Thus, when 
this kind of legal malpractice claim is tried, the question at trial is 
actually the underlying personal injury claim, or what is commonly 
referred to as the “case-within-the-case.” 
The issue is best illustrated from an incident that occurred during 
the first author’s observations in three law firms as part of his study of 
contingency fee practice.36 A lawyer in one of the firms had missed a 
filing deadline, and the firm was appealing the dismissal by arguing that 
the deadline was actually a couple of days later. One of the lawyers 
explained that if the appeal was unsuccessful, the firm was likely to be 
sued by its client. The lawyer went on to observe that while the client 
would still have to prove the underlying case (the “case-within-the-
case”), juries were more likely to find negligence in the underlying case 
when it was the plaintiff’s former lawyer who would be on the hook for 
the damages than when it was the original defendant who would have to 
pay any award. In this instance, the firm was successful on its appeal, so 
the issue of what would happen at a legal malpractice trial was not 
tested. Nor would it likely have been tested, given the lawyer’s concern 
about jurors’ attitudes toward lawyer defendants; almost certainly the 
firm’s insurer would have settled with the client. 
In the course of our conversations with insurers and practitioners in 
the legal malpractice arena, a number of people mentioned this same 
                                                          
 34. Claims can also be brought against lawyers by former clients (or possibly the beneficiary 
of former clients) under a contract theory, a breach of fiduciary duty theory, or possibly a fraud 
theory; lawyers can also, in some circumstances, face fraud claims from nonclients. See VINCENT R. 
JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW 13-14, 166-88 (2011). 
 35. See Chalidze, supra note 33, at 395 § 5. 
 36. The study is reported in HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: 
CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004). However, the incident 
described here is not recounted in that book. 
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phenomenon. Juries, they believe, are sufficiently hostile to lawyers so 
that the jurors are more likely to find negligence in the underlying case 
in the context of a legal malpractice trial than if the original case went to 
trial. We were unable to find any systematic evidence in support of this 
proposition, but it appears to loom large in the minds of insurers and 
practitioners. The perception of juror hostility might explain the fact that 
a large percentage of legal malpractice trials are bench trials. Our 
analysis of data on trial outcomes in 1996, 2001, and 2005, collected by 
the National Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) on behalf of the BJS, 
showed that 38.5% of legal malpractice trials were bench trials 
compared to only 2% in trials of physician malpractice.37 
Ideally, one would try to test this hypothesis by looking at actual 
jury verdicts. However, that approach is not practical. In the small 
number of legal malpractice cases in the BJS/NCSC dataset, there is a 
very modest tendency for juries to find for the plaintiff more often than 
do judges in bench trials (53% versus 43%), a difference that is not 
statistically significant given the small number of cases, and, also, a 
figure that is confounded by case selection issues.38 However, the small 
number of cases and case selection are actually not the most severe 
problem. First, it is likely that the cases tried to the bench are different in 
important ways from those tried to juries.39 Second, and more important, 
given that, as noted above, in a legal malpractice case the plaintiff 
generally has to prove both the case-within-the-case and the lawyer’s 
negligence, there is no way to know from actual cases whether the 
difference is due to one or both elements. Even if one could match the 
case-within-the-case in legal malpractice cases to simple negligence 
cases, this problem of confounding would still exist. 
                                                          
 37. These figures exclude cases where a trial started, but the parties reached a settlement 
before a verdict was reached. These data are available from the Interuniversity Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (“ICPSR”)—ICPSR studies 2883, 3957, and 23862. For the 1996 and 
2001 studies, the data were drawn for a sample of 45 and 46 of the 75 largest counties in the United 
States. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 173426, 
CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996 (Sept. 1999), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctcvlc96.pdf; THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 202803, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, 
(Apr. 2004), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctcvlc01.pdf; LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. 
COHEN U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 223851, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 
2005 (Oct. 2008), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf. The 2005 study was expanded 
to include a stratified sample of 110 of the 3066 counties outside the 75 largest. For details 
regarding the sampling strategy for the 2005 study, see LANGTON & COHEN, supra at 11. 
 38. These figures are from our own reanalysis of the 2005 BJS civil verdict study. The data 
for this study was obtained from the ICPSR data archive. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, ICPSR 23862, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 2005 at 9-13 (2005). 
 39. A bench trial will occur only if neither party has requested a jury trial. If either party 
thinks it would be advantaged by having a jury, then that party will demand a jury trial. 
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Thus, arguably, testing the hypothesis that lawyer-defendants are 
disadvantaged in jury trials is best accomplished experimentally. One 
can ask simulating jurors to decide the identical underlying case in the 
context of that case alone versus in the context of a legal malpractice 
case where the lawyer’s negligence has been stipulated. With this kind 
of experiment, the only difference in the cases will be whether the 
defendant is the former lawyer or the original defendant. This was an 
approach used by Valerie Hans in her study of whether jurors were more 
or less likely to hold a business responsible than a homeowner.40 Using 
simulated jurors, the experiment reported below tested two hypotheses 
regarding lawyers being disadvantaged as defendants: (1) juries are more 
likely to find for the plaintiff when the defendant who will have to pay 
any damages is the plaintiff’s former lawyer; and (2) juries award more 
in damages when the defendant is the plaintiff’s former lawyer.41 
III. METHOD 
To test the two hypotheses, we designed an Internet experiment 
involving three distinct cases: the first involving an auto accident where 
the issue related to causation of one of the claimed injuries and damages; 
the second involving a slip (actually a trip) and fall on a sidewalk in a 
residential neighborhood involving both liability and damages; and, the 
third involving a claim of medical malpractice concerning both liability 
and damages. We describe each of our cases in more detail below.42 For 
each of the three cases, we created two versions: a legal malpractice 
version in which the plaintiff’s original lawyer had missed a filing 
deadline and was consequently being sued for legal malpractice; and, a 
control version being the original tort case itself. In the legal malpractice 
condition, the respondents were told that the lawyer was not contesting 
the allegation that he had missed the filing deadlines (that is, he had 
breached his duty to his former client);43 they were only to decide 
whether the original tortfeasor was negligent and what damages were 
due to the plaintiff. In the legal malpractice condition, we included a 
question to determine if the respondent had recognized that the lawyer 
was the defendant and excluded from the analysis persons who had not 
understood that it was the lawyer who was the defendant who would 
have to pay any damages.44 The experiment produced a total of 1157 
                                                          
 40. Hans, supra note 6, at 42-46. 
 41. See infra Part III. 
 42. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 43. The defendant-lawyer was male in all three of our cases. 
 44. We conducted three rounds of the experiment. We used the results of the first round to 
estimate the percentage of respondents in the legal malpractice condition for each of the three cases 
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usable respondents who comprise the sample used in the analysis 
reported below.45 The median time required by those respondents to 
complete the exercise was 20.4 minutes.46 
A. The Cases 
1.   Auto Case 
The auto case was based on a trial observed by the first author in a 
rural county in a Midwestern state. The defense lawyer for that case 
made his trial notebook available. It included the deposition transcripts 
for the treating physicians and the defense’s medical expert. The 
accident occurred because an elderly driver made a left turn in front of 
oncoming traffic. The plaintiff, a young mother, collided with the 
defendant’s car. The issue in the case was whether the plaintiff suffered 
an injury. She declined transportation to the hospital at the scene of the 
accident, but later went to an urgent care facility. The plaintiff testified 
that at urgent care she complained of pain in both her chest and her knee; 
she also had bruising on her face, presumably from the airbag that 
deployed. However, the clinic notes said nothing about complaints 
involving knee pain. A week after the accident, the plaintiff attended a 
previously-made appointment with a nurse-practitioner because she 
thought she might be pregnant. She testified that she told the nurse-
practitioner about the accident and that she still had some pain in her 
neck, back, and knee. Again, the notes of the appointment made no 
mention of knee pain (although, in later testimony, it came out that the 
notes did report that the nurse-practitioner observed a “well-healed 
bruise area” on the knee). 
The first medical record showing any evidence of pain in the knee 
was from an appointment two or three weeks after the accident when the 
plaintiff went to her clinic complaining about the knee. At that time, she 
was told to wear a knee brace and make an appointment with an 
orthopedist. She saw the orthopedist about a month after the accident; 
the orthopedist did not take an x-ray, but told her to continue wearing the 
                                                          
who recognized the manipulation and then oversampled in the subsequent rounds to try to  
equalize the number of usable responses for the experimental and control conditions for each of the 
three cases. 
 45. See supra Part III.A. 
 46. The results reported below are based on all respondents who completed the experiment 
and passed the manipulation check for the experimental (legal malpractice) condition. We repeated 
the analysis limiting the respondents to those who took between 5 and 120 minutes to complete the 
experiment; presumably, some of those who took a long time to complete were multitasking and 
took time to engage in other tasks. This eliminated a total of 71 respondents, but had little effect on 
the results reported below although some tests that achieved statistical significance with all 
respondents did not make the cut-off with the reduced number of respondents. 
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knee brace and undergo physical therapy. The pain actually became 
worse over the next several months, and when she finally returned to the 
orthopedist’s office, she saw a different physician who suggested she 
have an MRI. Because she was pregnant, she postponed the MRI until 
after her daughter was born. After the MRI, the orthopedist suggested 
some injections, but she decided not to receive them because the 
orthopedist told her that he could not be sure that they would help. She 
did not return until almost eighteen months later, after she had consulted 
with a lawyer who told her to go back to the orthopedist. At that time, 
the orthopedist told her that she needed a surgical procedure to look 
inside the knee and repair any damage. That procedure was carried out, 
and the knee was healed by the time of the trial. 
In his trial testimony, the treating orthopedist reported that the 
radiologist who read the MRI initially read the result as showing both 
fluid and a tear in the meniscus (the tendon inside the knee that holds the 
knee in proper position and supports it), but then modified his diagnosis 
to fluid and degeneration of the meniscus, but no tear through the 
meniscus. When the orthopedist personally reviewed the film after the 
plaintiff returned following advice from her lawyer, he thought he saw a 
tear in the meniscus and recommended a surgical procedure to further 
diagnose and possibly repair the condition. The orthopedist also testified 
that he had seen nothing in the medical records indicating any kind of 
injury to the knee that would have existed prior to the accident. 
The orthopedist hired by the defense reported that he had examined 
the plaintiff prior to the surgery and had reviewed the film of the MRI. 
He agreed with the revised diagnosis of the radiologist concluding that 
there was some change to the meniscus, but no tear. He also testified that 
striking the knee on the steering column, which is what the plaintiff 
claimed had happened in the accident, was not the kind of mechanism 
normally associated with a tear to the meniscus; such an injury typically 
occurs when the leg is twisted, as might happen during activities such as 
running, walking, jumping, or going up or down stairs. In his closing 
argument, the defense lawyer suggested that the tear could have 
occurred by the plaintiff unknowingly twisting her knee, as she was 
dealing with the care of her young children.  
The questions the jury was asked to decide were essentially whether 
the knee injury was due to the accident and, if it was, what damages 
(past pain and suffering, medical expenses, future pain and suffering) 
would be appropriate compensation in connection with that injury. In 
addition, the jury needed to determine the appropriate pain and suffering 
damages for the injuries that were not contested. The plaintiff’s lawyer 
suggested total damages of about $57,000, which included the roughly 
386 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:375 
$550 for lost wages and the charges from the urgent care clinic. While 
opposing any damages for the knee surgery, the defense acceded to 
damages covering the initial diagnostic procedures (including the  
MRI) and other treatment and suggested total damages of between 
$6000 and $7500. The simulated jurors were then asked to award 
amounts for medical expenses, past pain and suffering, and future pain 
and suffering.47 
2.   Medical Malpractice Case 
The medical malpractice case was based on the hypothetical case 
used by Christopher Robertson and David Yokum.48 Those researchers 
used a thirty-five minute videotaped mock trial in their experiment. 
Robertson shared with the present authors a transcript produced from the 
videotape, which was the basis of the case script for the medical 
malpractice case. Robertson and Yokum described the case in the 
following way: 
  The script was written by practicing physicians, who also served as 
both project consultants and the actors playing the expert witnesses. 
The scenario concerned the failure of a primary care physician to 
diagnose a possible case of lumbar radiculopathy [nerve irritation 
caused by damage to the discs between the vertebrae] and refer the 
patient to imaging, which allegedly would have allowed timely surgery 
and avoidance of the permanent disability that the patient now suffers. 
The primary dispute concerned whether the physician-defendant met 
the standard of care when, instead of ordering imaging, he simply 
instructed the patient to take painkillers and return if the pain got 
worse. The case was designed so that there was a right answer to this 
question of medical doctrine, one given by a national practice 
guideline published in the Annals of Internal Medicine.49 According to 
that guideline and the stipulated facts, the physician did violate the 
                                                          
 47. As noted above, this case was based on an actual trial observed by the first author. The 
jury in that trial awarded a total of about $17,500 in damages. That award included $7500 for past 
pain and suffering, about $9800 for past medical expenses, the stipulated amount for past wages, 
and $0 for future pain and suffering. Essentially, this was a win for the defense; the only part of the 
award that went beyond what was suggested by the defense was the cost of the knee surgery itself. 
The last demand from the plaintiff was $38,000; the defendant had made a formal offer of judgment 
in the amount of $14,800 and a further settlement offer prior to trial of $16,000. 
 48. Christopher T. Robertson & David V. Yokum, The Effect of Blinded Experts on Juror 
Verdicts, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 765, 770 (2012). In Robertson and Yokum’s experiment, the 
manipulation was whether one or both experts were “blinded” as to which side they were hired by 
with “neither” blinded as the control. Id. 
 49. Roger Chou et al., Diagnosis and Treatment of Low Back Pain: A Joint Clinical Practice 
Guideline from the American College of Physicians and the American Pain Society, 147 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 478, 478 (2007). 
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standard of care.50 To avoid confounding with the variables of interest, 
this guideline was not introduced in the stimulus trial for the present 
experiment. It is only a reference point for analysis. 
 The trial consisted of the following sequence: the trial judge’s 
introduction and preliminary instructions (based on the Revised 
Arizona Jury Instructions (RAJI)), very brief opening statements  
from the plaintiff and the defendant’s attorneys, the testimony of 
plaintiff’s expert, the cross-examination of plaintiff’s expert, the 
testimony of defendant’s expert, the cross-examination of defendant’s 
expert, very brief closing statements from the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s attorneys, and, lastly, jury instructions from the trial judge 
(also based on the RAJI).51 
Our reworking of the transcript produced a narrative of a trial with 
opening and closing statements, testimony by the experts for the two 
sides, and instructions from the judge.52 
3.   Premises Case 
The premises case was based on a case narrative used by researcher 
Leslie Ellis53 and was modified slightly for the present experiment. In 
this case, the plaintiff tripped over a sidewalk crack. His injuries 
included a cut to his forehead, a fractured eye socket, and headaches and 
dizziness for a period of years that limited his ability to work. The 
defendant was the owner of the home adjacent to the sidewalk. By law, 
homeowners are responsible for maintaining the sidewalk in front of 
their houses, and are liable for injuries if the sidewalk deteriorates to the 
point that it is in an “unreasonably dangerous condition.”54 A central 
                                                          
 50. See Robertson & Yokum, supra note 48, at 771. For the control condition, only 46% of 
the respondents found the physician negligent, even though they had designed the case so that the 
physician was in fact negligent. It is important to note again that the practice guide was not 
introduced; the standard of care was introduced only through expert testimony. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Our version used only Robertson and Yokum’s control condition in which both experts 
knew which side had retained them. We actually included a third condition, which we do not report 
in this Article. In that condition, we changed the physician’s name to something very foreign-
sounding to see if the physician from a group commonly seen as comprised of relatively recent 
immigrants was disadvantaged by his apparent national heritage. Without going into detail, we 
found no differences between that condition and our control condition, which used a name that 
would be seen as traditionally American. 
 53. Leslie Ellis, Don’t Find My Client Liable, But If You Do . . . : Defense 
Recommendations, Liability Verdicts, and General Damage Awards 193-206 (2002) (unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago). Ellis’s research question dealt with the impact 
of the lawyers suggesting specific amounts of damages. 
 54. Mark C. Dillon, Breaking the Ice: How Plaintiffs May Establish Premise Liability in 
“Black Ice” Cases Where the Dangerous Condition Is by Definition Not Visible or Apparent to 
Property Owners, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 694-97, 695 n.26 (2015). 
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question in this last case was whether the crack was sufficiently large to 
have made the sidewalk unreasonably dangerous. If the juror found it to 
be unreasonably dangerous, she needed to set an amount to compensate 
the plaintiff for past and future non-economic damages, including pain 
and suffering. The amount that the plaintiff would receive for medical 
expenses and lost wages if the defendant was found liable had been 
agreed to by the parties. In the version used in our research, there were 
opening and closing statements by the lawyers for each side, instructions 
from the judge, and testimony from three witnesses: the plaintiff, the 
homeowner, and a neighbor who witnessed the plaintiff falling. The 
simulated jurors were also shown a photo of the sidewalk with the crack. 
The plaintiff testified to the specific event and the impact of his injuries. 
The defendant testified that the crack had been there for some time and 
that, to his knowledge, no one had ever tripped on it prior to the plaintiff. 
The neighbor testified that she worked at home by a window that looks 
out toward the defendant’s house. She reported that she saw a lot of 
people walking down the sidewalk and had never witnessed anyone 
falling; she said that most people would see the crack and step over it. 
In closing arguments, the plaintiff’s attorney asked for $100,000 in 
damages. The defense attorney argued that the sidewalk was not 
unreasonably dangerous, and hence, the homeowner should not be found 
to have been negligent. He went on to argue that if the jurors were to 
find the homeowner to be negligent, the non-economic damages should 
be no more than $10,000. 
B. Sample and Survey Administration 
The sample population was drawn from an internet panel obtained 
through Qualtrics.55 Potential respondents were screened for jury 
eligibility by asking if they were registered to vote. Those who were not 
registered were asked if they were a U.S. citizen and, if yes, whether 
they would be eligible to vote if there were an upcoming election. 
Potential respondents who were not citizens or who could not register to 
vote were excluded. Respondents who completed the questions at the 
end of the case narrative were compensated in accordance with the 
policies of the panel provider.56 
                                                          
 55. Qualtrics is a survey service which provides both an online platform for surveys and 
sample generation. See QUALTRICS, http://www.qualtrics.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
 56. We paid $5 per respondent; we do not know how much of that actually went to the 
respondents. Generally, online survey panelists are slightly younger and better educated than the 
population as a whole, which means that our sample probably does not perfectly mirror a jury pool; 
of course, our respondents were not subject to anything resembling voir dire, which further 
distinguishes them from actual jurors. 
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After completing the informed consent section, respondents were 
screened for eligibility. Those determined to be eligible then read a brief 
introductory section followed by the case narrative itself. After 
completing the case narrative, respondents assigned to the experimental 
condition (legal malpractice) were asked a question to determine if they 
understood who the defendant was. As noted above, respondents who 
failed to identify the lawyer as the defendant were excluded from the 
analysis we report below. The next questions were the actual jury 
questions concerning liability and/or damages, as would be found on a 
jury verdict form. Respondents then completed a small set of 
demographic questions (year of birth, gender, education, current 
occupation, and household income), a political orientation/ideology 
question, questions about experience serving on juries or personal 
involvement as a plaintiff or defendant in a lawsuit, two questions 
assessing attitudes toward the tort system, and, depending on the 
condition questions, about whether the respondent or anyone in the 
respondent’s immediate family had attended (or was attending) law or 
medical school. 
The survey was administered by the staff of the University of 
Minnesota College of Liberal Arts’ Office of Information Technology 
using the Qualtrics survey system. 
C. Results 
1.   Auto Case 
Because there was no issue of liability in the auto case, the 
respondents were only asked to provide amounts for three elements of 
damages: medical expenses, past pain and suffering, and future pain and 
suffering. Our hypothesis was that higher damages would be awarded in 
the legal malpractice condition. Table 1 shows various statistics for each 
of the three elements of damages and for the total of those three 
elements, along with the results of four statistical tests.57 
 
                                                          
 57. See infra Table 1. 
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TABLE 1: DAMAGES FOR AUTO ACCIDENT CASE 
Looking only at the means shown in Table 1, it appears that there 
were substantial differences between the experimental and control 
groups, with the mean for the former about three times the latter for total 
damages and more than four times the latter for future pain and 
suffering. However, none of the t-tests shown in Table 1 achieved 
statistical significance at the .05 one-tailed level, although all would be 
significant at the .10 one-tailed level. The patterns shown in Table 1 
could well have been produced by a random process rather than reflect 
systematic differences between conditions.58 A close examination of the 
distributions of the various damage amounts set by the two groups of 
respondents shows that the apparent differences evidenced by the means 
probably reflect a small number of outliers among the respondents in the 
experimental condition. Moreover, the medians shown in Table 1 do 
exhibit particularly large differences in absolute terms. Perhaps there are 
differences, but these are obscured by the outliers. To check for this 
possibility, we also ran tests that are not sensitive to a small number of 
extreme values. 
                                                          
 58. All of the t-tests were done assuming unequal variances for the two groups because the 
test for equality of variances showed very clearly that the variances for the two groups were not 
equal, and that is fairly clear in the standard deviations shown in Table 1. 
Control Experimental Control Experimental
Mean $3,649 $5,425 $4,040 $8,439
Median $375 $720 $750 $1,000




Wilcoxon rank sum test
Control Experimental Control Experimental
Mean $3,059 $13,463 $10,747 $27,327
Median $11 $100 $2,175 $3,100




Wilcoxon rank sum test
t=1.47, p=.072




Past Pain & Suffering
(c)




Z=1.56, p=.060 Z=1.62, p=.053
Notes: N's are 178 for control and 195 for experimental; t-tests assume unequal 
variances; all p-values are one-tailed
Z=1.90, p=.028 Z=1.71, p=.044
Z=0.65, p=.251
Z=1.37, p=.085 Z=1.54, p=.062
Z=0.78, p=.219 Z=1.41, p=.079
Z=1.91, p=..028
Z=0.78, p=.218 Z=1.51, p=.066
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We applied two such tests. As shown in Table 1, the median test59 
provides inconsistent evidence of statistically discernible differences in 
the amounts awarded for past medical costs, past pain and suffering, and 
total damages. The inconsistency arises from how observations falling 
exactly at the median are handled. The test is significant at the .05 level 
only when we combine those observations with the observations falling 
above the median test. For future pain and suffering, the median test 
provides no evidence of significant differences between the control and 
experimental group. 
A second test that is insensitive to extreme values is the Wilcoxon 
rank sum test.60 As shown in Table 1, none of the Wilcoxon rank sum 
tests achieved statistical significance at the .05 level, although three (the 
two past damage amounts and total damages) would be statistically 
significant at the .10 level (one-tailed). 
Another approach to dealing with the skew in the amounts of 
damages is to convert the values to natural logarithms. This also has the 
advantage of shifting the distribution to something that more closely 
approaches the normal distribution, which is one of the standard 
assumptions of the t-test. Table 2 shows a series of t-tests based on the 
natural logarithms of the damage amounts.61 The column labeled emean is 
the exponentiation of the mean of the logarithm of the damages.62 The 
results shown in Table 2 are consistent with the previous discussion; the 
only statistically significant differences (or almost statistically 
significant differences) are for past pain and suffering and total damages. 
                                                          
 59. SIDNEY SIEGEL, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 115-16 
(1956). In the median test, the observations are split into those above and below the overall median, 
and then separate proportions for above and below the overall median for the two groups to be 
compared. The statistical test is either a simple difference of proportions test or a 2x2 chi square 
test; we used the former because we have a directional hypothesis. The software we used, Stata, 
actually computes the chi square; we report the square root of that chi square and divide the p-value 
of the chi square by two in order to obtain the one-tailed p-value. One challenge in performing the 
median test is the handling of observations that fall exactly at the overall median; there are four 
alternatives: classify all of these cases into the below group, classify all cases into the above group, 
exclude cases falling at the median, and splitting the cases at the median into above and below. 
Tables 1, 3, and 4 show only results using the first two approaches. 
 60. See THOMAS H. WONNACOTT & RONALD J. WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 
525 (1990). The Wilcoxon test, which is equivalent to the Mann-Whitney U test, can be thought of 
as roughly equivalent to a t-test which has been done on the ranks of the dependent variable rather 
than on the original values. The statistical distribution underlying the Wilcoxon test is standard 
normal distribution (hence, producing a Z-value) rather than a t-distribution because the ranks have 
a uniform distribution and the standard deviation of the uniform distribution is known because it is 
defined by the minimum and maximum values. The advantage of this test is that it is insensitive to 
skew in the data and has a standard way of handling tied ranks. 
 61. See infra Table 2. 
 62. The logarithms were computed by adding 1 to the value to be transformed prior to taking 
the logarithm. 
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TABLE 2: TESTS USING THE LOGARITHM  
OF DAMAGES FOR THE AUTO CASE 
We conclude that, for the auto case, there is, at best, a  
suggestion that respondents in the experimental condition involving 
legal malpractice might have been a bit more generous in their  
setting of damages than were respondents in the non-malpractice  
control condition. 
2.   Premises Case 
For the premises case, respondents were asked to both make a 
determination on liability and, for those who found the homeowner to 
have been negligent, to specify a figure for non-economic damages 
(such as pain and suffering). A higher percentage of respondents in the 
experimental group (42%, n=203) than in the control group (34%, 
n=186) found the homeowner to have been negligent. This difference 
was statistically significant under the directional (one-tailed) hypothesis, 
that there was a higher likelihood of finding negligence in the 
malpractice condition than in the non-malpractice condition .05 level 
(Z=1.72, p=.042).63 
Table 3 shows statistics for the control and experimental groups, 
comparing the damages set by respondents who found the homeowner 
negligent, along with both t-tests (one for the untransformed 
compensation award and one for the natural logarithm of the 
compensation award) plus a median test.64 The t-tests support the 
hypothesis that lawyer defendants were disadvantaged compared to the 
original tortfeasor, but the median test is ambiguous. The results for the 
median test at first appear odd, producing a significant test if 
observations at the median are classified as above the median and  
producing a test statistic approaching zero when those observations are 
classified as below the median. The problem here is that the overall 
median is $50,000, and there are a substantial number of observations in 
                                                          
 63. Limiting the respondents to those who took between 5 and 120 minutes to complete the 
survey reduced the gap to 7 percentage points which, combined with slight drop in sample sizes, no 
longer produced a statistically significant test of the difference in proportions. 
 64. See infra Table 3. 
mean std dev e
mean
mean std dev e
mean
t p
Past Medical Expenses 6.416 2.676 $612 6.072 2.764 $433 -1.223 0.111
Past Pain and Suffering 6.258 3.064 $522 5.709 3.246 $302 -1.681 0.047
Future Pain and Suffering 4.200 3.935 $67 3.852 3.849 $47 -0.862 0.195
Total Compensation 7.701 2.635 $2,210 7.237 2.854 $1,390 -1.63 0.052
Experimental Control
Notes: N's are 178 for control and 195 for experimental; t-tests assume equal variances; all p-values are one-
tailed
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the experimental group falling at $50,000.65 Table 3 also shows the 
Wilcoxon rank sum test described previously. Consistent with the t-tests, 
the Wilcoxon test was statistically significant. A close look at the data 
distribution confirms that there is a broad difference in the damages set 
by the experimental and control groups. For example, both the first and 
third quartiles are higher for the experimental group ($20,000 to 
$100,000) compared to the control group ($10,000 to $75,000). This is 
evident in Figure 1, which is a box plot showing the distributions for the 
two groups; values have been transformed to base 10 logarithms to 
better show the spread. 
 






















                                                          
 65. Two other alternatives—evenly dividing the observations at the median between the 
above and below groups or deleting those observations from the test—both produce test statistics 




Std. Dev. $47,372 $81,179









Wilcoxon rank sum test
t=2.08, p=.020
Z=1.93, p=.027
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FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGE VALUES  
FOR PREMISES CASE 
 From the above analyses, we conclude that there was a tendency in 
the premises case for the respondents who found the homeowner to have 
been negligent to award somewhat higher damages when defendant was 
the plaintiff’s former lawyer than would be the case if the homeowner 
were the actual defendant. However, while a difference was detectable, 
the magnitude of that difference was modest. 
3.   Medical Malpractice Case 
In the medical malpractice case respondents were asked two 
questions which together determine whether the physician was liable or, 
in the experimental condition, would have been liable. The first question 
asked whether the physician had been negligent: 41% of the control 
condition respondents found negligence compared to 34% of the 
experimental condition respondents. No statistical test is needed because 
the direction of the difference is the reverse of what was hypothesized. 
Those respondents who found the physician negligent were then asked 
whether the physician’s negligence had caused the plaintiff’s claimed 
injury: 77% of the control condition respondents found causation 
compared to 87% of the experimental condition respondents. Using a 
one-tailed difference of proportions test at the .05 level, that difference 
was not statistically significant (Z=1.50, p=.067). Combining these two 
questions to determine liability, 31% of the control condition 
respondents found the physician liable compared to 30% of the 
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experimental condition respondents who would have held the physician 
liable. Clearly, there is no evidence in Table 4 to conclude that there was 
a greater inclination among those in the experimental group to find the 
physician at fault for the plaintiff’s claimed injury.66 It is worth noting 
again that the case was designed so that there was negligence on the part 
of the physician, but less than 40% of the respondents found negligence, 
and even fewer found liability. 

















Table 4 provides statistics and relevant tests of significance for 
damages in the medical malpractice case.67 The number of respondents 
who provided figures for damages is small because less than a third had 
found the doctor liable. The untransformed mean for the control group 
was actually higher than that for the experimental group due in part to 
one extreme response; however, even removing that response, the mean 
of the control ($284,466) exceeded that of the experimental group shown 
in Table 4. Using the log transformation, the mean of the experimental 
group was higher, as is the median of the experimental group. The tests 
of significance produced inconsistent results. Neither the t-test for the 
log transform, nor the Wilcoxon test, was statistically significant;68 the 
median test produced a statistically significant result if observations 
                                                          
 66. See infra Table 4. 
 67. See supra Table 4. 
 68. No test need be computed for the untransformed award because the direction of  





Std. Dev. $1,712,454 $262,579














Notes: t-test for untransformed award omitted because 
difference of means is the reverse of the hypothesis; t-
test for log transform assumes equal variances; all p-
values are two-tailed.
t=0.95, p=.171
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falling exactly at the median are grouped with those above the median 
while using the “below” variant is not statistically significant.69 
We conclude that there is at best minimal evidence that the 
simulated jurors in this case were more plaintiff-friendly when the actual 
defendant was the plaintiff’s former lawyer. 
IV. FURTHER ANALYSES 
While the experimental setup means that we should expect there to 
be no differences between the experimental and control groups other 
than the experimental manipulation, it is always possible that some 
differences might remain that could impact the results. To test for this 
possibility, we constructed regression models that added various controls 
in addition to the experimental manipulation. The control variables we 
used included the following: 
 respondent’s gender; 
 respondent’s education (three categories: high school or less, 
some college, college degree or more); 
 household income (we used a four-point scale:  
1=under $25,000, 2=$25,000-$50,000, 3=$50,000-$100,000, 
4=over $100,000); 
 prior experience on a civil jury; 
 experience as a defendant in a lawsuit (other than divorce); 
 experience as a plaintiff in a lawsuit (other than divorce); 
 political ideology (three categories collapsed from a seven-
point scale: conservative, middle-of-the-road, liberal); 
 whether any member of the respondent’s immediate family 
was a lawyer or was currently in law school; and 
 for the medical malpractice case only, whether any member 
of the respondent’s immediate family was a physician or was 
currently in medical school. 
We estimated logistic regression models for the liability issue and 
ordinary linear regression models for damage amounts (both 
untransformed and log transformed). Most of the regressions produced 
minimal effects from the control variables, and none revealed effects of 
the experimental manipulation that would lead us to modify our 
conclusions about one or more of the three versions of the cases used in 
the study. 
                                                          
 69. Both of the two variants, dropping those cases at the median or splitting those cases 
evenly between above and below, produce tests that almost meet the .05 one-tailed threshold 
(p=.052 for “drop” and .056 for “split”). 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this study, we set out to test the argument that juries are more 
plaintiff-friendly in cases tried in the context of admitted legal 
malpractice than they would be if they were simply trying the case-
within-the-case. We designed three different cases to use in our test of 
this hypothesis, each involving a different context (auto accident, 
premises liability, and medical malpractice) and differing in the evidence 
and circumstances the jurors had to assess.70 In only one of the three 
cases, the premises case, did we find clear support for our  
hypothesis. Moreover, even in that case, both the differences in the 
probability of finding for the plaintiff and the difference between the 
amounts awarded in the experimental and control conditions would be 
best described as modest. 
There were hints of possible effects for the auto case, where 
respondents were only asked to set damage amounts. The fact that the 
possible effect we did find was limited to economic damages (that is, 
past medical expenses) suggests that jurors might be inclined to accept a 
plaintiff’s position when there is a question about causation, at least with 
regard to expenses the plaintiff might have incurred, but not with regard 
to compensation for pain and suffering. Interestingly, this interpretation 
is consistent with the actual result in the case upon which our narrative 
was based. In that case, the jury did award the costs of surgery for the 
claimed knee injury while not awarding damages the plaintiff requested 
for the pain and suffering associated with the knee injury. 
There was no consistent evidence of any of the hypothesized effects 
in the medical malpractice case. Even though the case narrative was 
designed such that there was negligence and liability on the part of the 
physician, less than one third of our respondents in either condition 
found that the doctor was, or would have been, liable. This amount is 
even lower than the 46% Robertson and Yokum reported for their 
control condition when they used a video version of the case.71 While 
some critics might argue that the nature of the case was sufficiently 
technical that lay jurors even in an actual trial, to say nothing of subjects 
acting as jurors in a simulation experiment, would have significant 
                                                          
 70. See supra Part III.A. 
 71. Robertson & Yokum, supra note 48, at 777. There is one unexplored explanation for the 
surprisingly low likelihood that respondents found the doctor-defendant liable (both in our study 
and in Robertson and Yokum’s experiment). Specifically, the scenario was created such that the 
defendant-physician had failed to follow published guidelines for dealing with patients who 
presented as the plaintiff did; however, the respondents were not specifically informed of those 
guidelines. If the testimony had made clear that the guidelines had not been followed, more subjects 
would likely have found the physician to be negligent and liable. 
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difficulty grasping the relevant details and responded by giving the 
physician the benefit of the doubt. However, that does not explain the 
absence of differences in the amount of damages awarded when the 
physician was determined to be liable. 
The results in the present experiment are, at best, suggestive of how 
things work in practice. As with any jury simulation study, there are 
inevitable questions about external validity, and those issues are 
probably enhanced in our study. While we sought to design our 
experimental scenarios to emphasize the lawyer as defendant, the 
manipulation check variable indicates that we had mixed success. This, 
in turn, suggests that telling respondents that the lawyer is the defendant, 
as we have done, is a far cry from jurors seeing the lawyer sitting at the 
defense table over the several days (or more) that an actual trial would 
take. However, for an empirical exploration of the question we have 
posed, the only real option would be some form of jury simulation. We 
could have made our study more realistic by creating video versions of 
the trial, having groups of respondents watch one of the two versions of 
the video and then have the groups deliberate for a period of time before 
taking votes. The cost of such a study would be substantial, particularly 
if it were to include more than one case. Furthermore, one might expect 
that, if there was a very substantial anti-lawyer effect, even a relatively 
weak experimental setup would produce some clear effects; on the other 
hand, if there were at most modest anti-lawyer effects, the type of 
experiment used here could be very problematic. 
Returning to the question we opened with: does our study provide 
evidence of popular hostility toward lawyers generally, and plaintiffs’ 
lawyers in particular? Maybe a little, but we would be hard pressed to 
argue that our study suggests that lay jurors want to punish lawyers by 
favoring plaintiffs in legal malpractice trials. Perhaps the “jurors” in our 
study saw themselves in the role of potential defendants to the 
underlying case. Perhaps our results reflect the reality of the perception 
among plaintiffs’ lawyers that jurors have become less favorable toward 
plaintiffs as a result of the campaign by insurance companies and 
conservative interest groups.72 
Finally, what are the potential implications of our results for 
practicing lawyers who might face a legal malpractice claim and for the 
insurers and defense counsel who handle those claims? If one is 
prepared to accept the validity of the present experiment we have 
                                                          
 72. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Texas Plaintiffs’ Practice in the Age of Tort 
Reform: Survival of the Fittest—It’s Even More True Now, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 285, 295-97 
(2006). 
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conducted—that is, our findings reflect what would happen in actual 
legal malpractice trials—then the fear lawyers express about juror 
prejudice disadvantaging lawyer-defendants in such trials is misplaced. 
Lawyers certainly do not have the advantages that physicians seem to 
have in medical malpractice trials,73 but our simulated jurors did not 
express the approbation of lawyers to affect how they judged cases or set 
damages. This point was reinforced by a lawyer who specialized in 
plaintiffs’ legal malpractice whom we interviewed as part of the larger 
study. When we raised this issue and briefly told him about the results of 
our experiment, he said he was “not surprised,” and went on to observe: 
“It is a perception, but I do not think it’s accurate.” He went on to 
explain why he did not think it was an issue: 
Good defense lawyers handle [the issue of anti-lawyer sentiment] in voir 
dire very effectively: 
Defense lawyer: “How many people don’t like lawyers?” 
Everybody raises their hand. 
Defense lawyer: And tell me when you needed a will, who did you 
go to?” 
Juror: “I went to a lawyer.” 
Defense lawyer: “When you got divorced, who did you go to?” 
Juror: “I went to a lawyer.” 
Defense lawyer: “And did you depend on those lawyers?” 
Juror: “Yes.” 
Defense lawyer: “How did they do?” 
Juror: “Well they did a pretty good job.” 
Defense lawyer: “Those lawyers weren’t so bad, were they?” 
                                                          
 73. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
